Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil

Ambition theory suggests that scholars can understand a good deal about politics by exploring politicians career goals. In the USA, an enormous literature explains congressional politics by assuming that politicians primarily desire to win re-election. In contrast, although Brazils institutions appear to encourage incumbency, politicians do not seek to build a career within the legislature. Instead, political ambition focuses on the subnational level. Even while serving in the legislature, Brazilian legislators act strategically to further their future extra-legislative careers by serving as ambassadors of subnational governments. Brazils federal institutions also affect politicians electoral prospects and career goals, heightening the importance of subnational interests in the lower chamber of the national legislature. Together, ambition and federalism help explain important dynamics of executive-legislative relations in Brazil. This books rational-choice institutionalist perspective contributes to the literature on the importance of federalism and subnational politics to understanding national-level politics around the world. Contents
List of tables and figures
Abbreviations and acronyms
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part I: 1. Ambition theory and political careers in Brazil
2. In the absence of congressional careerism: short stints, flat hierarchies and low payoffs in the chamber of deputies
3. Progressive ambition and congressional hot seats in Brazil, 19451998
4. Labyrinths of power, Brazilian style: post-chamber political careers
Part II: 5. The Gubematorial coattails effect: federalism and congressional elections in Brazil
Part III: 6. On the political (in)efficacy of pork-barreling in the chamber of deputies
7. Progressive ambition, federalism and pork-barreling in Brazil
8. Institutions of their own design? democratization and fiscal decentralization in Brazil, 19751995
9. The Cardoso administration and changes in Brazilian federalism
Conclusion
Appendices
References
Indexes.

Author/Editor Details
David Samuels, University of Minnesota