Written by one of todays most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. Millikan places cognitive psychology in an evolutionary context where human cognition is assumed to be an outgrowth of primitive forms of mentality, and assumed to have functions in the biological sense. Of particular interest are her discussions of the nature of abilities as different from dispositions, her detailed analysis of the psychological act of reidentifying substances, and her critique of the language of thought for mental representation. In a radical departure from current philosophical and psychological theories of concepts, this book provides the first in-depth discussion on the psychological act of reidentification. Contents
Preface
1. Introducing substance concepts
2. Substances: the ontology
3. Classifying, identifying, and the function of substance concepts
4. The nature of abilities: how is extension determined?
5. More mama, more milk and more mouse: the structure and development of substance concepts
6. Substance concepts through language
knowing the meanings of words
7. How we make our ideas clear: epistemology for empirical concepts
8. Content and vehicle in perception
9. Sames versus sameness in conceptual contents and vehicles
10. Grasping sameness
11. In search of Strawsonian modes of presentation
12. Rejecting identity judgments and Fregean modes
13. Knowing what Im thinking of
14. How extensions of new substance concepts are fixed: how substance concepts acquire intentionality
15. Cognitive luck: substance concepts in an evolutionary frame
Appendices
References
Index.
Author/Editor Details
Ruth Garrett Millikan, University of Connecticut